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Stein's Understanding of Mental Health 
and Mental Illness 
Mette Lebech 
Abstract This chapter discusses Stein's understanding of mental health and mental 
illness in order to contribute to phenomenologically determine the formal object of 
psychiatry. It first outlines and defends Stein's understanding of the psyche as an 
element of psycho-physical beings constituted from experiences marked by life 
power. Then it highlights three functions of the psychic mechanism that support 
mental health and which are affected in mental illness: vitality, rationality and trust. 
Finally the various ways in which psychic contagion can instigate and aggravate 
mental illness are discussed. It is argued that psychic causality is causing both the 
disturbances studied by psychiatry and the state of equilibrium its range of healing 
practices pursue and that thus the dysfunctional psyche, i.e. the psyche that does not 
support meaningful experiencing, is the formal object of psychiatry. 
In her Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities Edith Stein attempts to phe-
nomenologically identify (constitute) the specific objects studied respectively by 
the sciences of psychology and the humanities.1 As a student of Husserl and the 
editor of his Ideas II and Ill, she had made her own Husserl's radical project of 
phenomenologically founding the sciences. The fact that she wrote her dissertation 
immediately after having resigned as his assistant indicates that she thought his 
attempt to outline the ontological regions concerned with the human being remained 
in need of revision or completion. Stein had left Breslau to study phenomenology 
with Husserl because she thought psychology was still in need of having its 
1 The German title Beitrage zur philosophischen BegrUndung der Psychologie und der 
Geisteswissenschaften is literally translated as 'contributions towards the philosophical foundation 
of psychology and the humanities'. The work will be referred to in the following as PPH. The 
foreword starts: 'The following investigations undertake to penetrate into the essence of sentient 
reality and of the mind from various sides, and thereby to secure the groundwork for a definition 
of psychology and the humanities that will fit the facts.' CWES 7, 2000, 1. An earlier version of 
this paper has been published in German in M. Lebech and H.-B. Gerl-Falkovitz, 2017, under the 
title: 'Psychische Gesundheit und Krankheit bei Edith Stein', pp. 188-202. 
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fundamental concepts clarified, and because she hoped phenomenology could 
accomplish that. In her later 'Die 'fypen der Psychologie und ihre Bedeutung fur die 
Padagogik' (ESGA 16: 9-14)' she distinguishes three types of psychology: meta-
physical or rational, empirical (descriptive, explanatory, understanding and classifi-
catory) and practical knowledge of character, all of which rely on the 
phenomenological clarification of the specific object of psychology as the key to 
their coherence. In Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, she realises the 
ambition to provide psychology with that for the lack of which she had abandoned 
its study: an analysis of its formal object. Her work has not yet, however, had much 
influence on mainstream psychology.3 
The fundamental claim of Stein's treatise is that the psyche is constituted in or 
identified from those experiences in which life-power plays a role, as that which 
accounts for the fact that our experiences seem to use up energy and be energised in 
various ways.4 The phenomenon of life power waxing and waning manifests experi-
ential or psychic causality, distinct from physical causality by the fact that it is expe-
rienced in and as a feature of the experiences themselves.' The psyche is like a battery, 
the energy of which is being used up in experience and recharged through rest. 
Stein does not at length address the question of mental illness. In her description 
of the psyche, however, phenomena related to mental illness are often discussed. 
Here, we shall argue for the plausibility of her understanding of the psyche and 
build on it to clarify what can be understood by psychic illness in so far as this 
understanding of the psyche is approximately correct. 
The fact that Stein describes the constitution of the psyche in great detail is a 
practice that implies that our intelligible experience is the implicit reason for iden-
tifying psychic experience at all, and thus the implicit norm for its being healthy. It 
seems in fact that this practice lies at the heart of all psychology. From it we can 
deduce that being mentally healthy is being in a psychological condition that allows 
2 References are given to the Edith Stein Gesamtsausgahe (ESGA) and to the Collected Works of 
Edith Stem (CWES). If two sets of page numbers are given, the page numbers in square brackets 
refer to the German text of Edith Stein Gesamtausgabe (ESGA). Other abbreviations used: 
PE = On the Problem of Empathy, trans. by W. Stein, 3rd revised edition. Dordrecht: Springer 
1989. 
PPH = Philosophy ojPsychologyand the Humanities, translated by M. C. Baseheart and 
M. Sawicki. Washington, DC: ICS Publications 2000. 
3 For some studies see A. Ales Bello 2003, 2007 and 2010, Meneses and Larldn 2012, M. Lebech 
2004, C. Betchart 2009 and 2010, A. Togni 2016. 
4 Beitrii,ge zur philosophischen BegrUndung des Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften/ 
Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities I: Psychische Kausalitiit/Psychic Causality. 
5 Stein in fact claims that psychic causality is experientially prior to physical causality, and that the 
latter in its identification therefore is dependent on the former (PPH: 3-6). An assessment of this 
and of its significant consequences would be a topic for another paper. For our purposes we note 
that an understanding of psychic events as being caused by physical causality depends on the 
understanding of the role psychic causality plays in them: it is not possible to attribute a physical 
cause to a psychic event without identifying the psychic event as such. The analysis of the phenom- . 
enon of psychic causality with which Stein is concerned can thus not be dispensed with either by 
a naturalist psychology and psychiatry. 
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for our experiences to be experienced as meaningful.6 By implication, the psychic 
phenomena are not all immediately experienced to be meaningful. They are occur-
rences experienced in our experiencing itself, which would not occur to a pure! Y 
spiritual person (e.g. an angel), such as being tired, being tired of something, being 
intoxicated, infatuated, feeling sensual pleasure, pain or sexual attraction, being ill, 
hungry, confused, emotionally wrought, traumatised, sluggish, over-stimulated, 
dreaming, sleeping, hallucinating or suppressing feelings and thoughts. 
On Stein's understanding of the psyche, the mental illness or mental health of a 
historical person is centrally a natural phenomenon, not a historical event (PE: 93 
[111]).7 It is in other words a caused occurrence, not an action the motivations of 
which can be understood, even if motivations play a role in the onset or manage-
ment of the illness and even if it may in turn explain historical events. Mental illness 
is not a human action; it is something that happens to us, even when it results from 
something we do. Both the modem insistence on it being an illness and the older 
ways of speaking of madness as possession or lunacy indicate it nevertheless is 
something that needs to be resisted. 
Stein mentions Iphigenia as an example of one who successfully resists mental 
illness in the face of events conducive to provoking it. 8 In the plays by Euripides 
(she refers to a reworking by Goethe of Iphigenia in Tauris), Iphigenia was sacri-
ficed by her father Agamemnon to Artemis, then rescued and abducted by the god-
dess to be her priestess, and finally, many years later, fleeing together with her 
brother matricide, whom she would have been bound to sacrifice had she not fled. 
In choosing to live and forgive, in choosing to tell the truth and trust in the goodness 
of the gods, she displays heroic virtue in the mastering ofnegative feelings by _which 
she could otherwise have been overcome (horror, dread, hurt, sorrow, lonelmess). 
Had she sacrificed her brother knowingly, she would have committed the same 
crime against him as was earlier committed against her and would thereby have 
consummated the curse upon their house. She would have confirmed the tragic 
meaninglessness of her own sufferings and actions, which might indeed so have 
assaulted her psyche that a breakdown would result, as tragedy did in the case of 
6 'These considerations lead us to the conclusion that the spiritual subject is essentially subject to 
rational laws and that its experiences are intelligibly related' (PE: 97). The World Health 
Organisation gives the following definition of human wellness, of which mental health is an aspect 
(in Strengthening mental health promotion, Geneva, WHO 2001, Fact Sheet, no 220): human well-
ness 'in which every individual realizes his or her own potential, can cope with the normal stresses 
of life, can work productively and fruitfully, and is able to make a contribution to his or her com-
munity.' I take this characterisation to be very close to the one proposed above. 
7 Stein's distinction between mental derangement and psychic illness proper is discussed in Sect. 3 
below. If one were to count derangement in her sense as mental illness, one would have to say 
mental illness would be a historical event to the extent that it is motivated. 
a 'Faced with the choice whether to save her brother, his friend, and herself through lies and deceit 
or to abandon all of them to ruin, she first believes that she must chose the "lesser evil." But her 
pure soul is not able to bear untruthfulness and b~each ~f tru_s~; sh~ defends hers~lf ~gainst thes~ ~s 
does a healthy nature against germs of fatal disease. Spmtuallty of the Chri~t1an Worn.an m 
Woman, transl. F.M. Oben, CWES vol II, 91. The brother, having murdered therr mother, 1s also 
characterised as • defiled by matricide, agonized by remorse to the point of madness.' Ibid. 
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Oedipus. Apart from Iphigenia, Our Lady is mentioned as a prototype of health, 
noting that her humility and faith sheltered her from the assaults on her psyche, 
which the extraordinary and, to a non-believing view, tragic events of her life, would 
have constituted.' 
In the more popular writings Stein frequently refers to the 'contemporary sick-
ness', 'illnesses of our times', 'social illnesses' and 'illnesses of our people' .10 The 
question is whether she by this means that those times or social environments are 
more conducive to provoking mental illness in individuals or that the times and 
environments themselves are ill in a way that is analogous to mental illness. As she 
regards psychic causality to be transmissible from person to person through sentient 
contagion, the answer is probably: both. 
The illness afflicting her people in 1932 is portrayed in the following manner: 
There is an inner disunion, a complete deficiency of a set of convictions and strong princi-
ples, an aimless drifting. Therefore, the great mass of humanity seeks for an anaesthetic in 
ever new, ever more refined delights. Those who wish to maintain a sober level of life, in 
order to protect themselves from contemporary turmoil, frequently annihilate this level by 
one-sided professional work; but even they cannot do anything to escape the turmoil. Only 
whole human beings as we have described them are immune to the contemporary sickness: 
such beings are steadfast on eternal first principles, unperturbed in their views and in their 
actions by the changing modes of thoughts, follies, and depravities surrounding them. 11 
Would such social illness also be a caused occurrence and not a historical event 
in the same way as mental illness is? It clearly involves some level of individual 
responsibility, but only for what Hannah Arendt would call 'banal' things: being 
superficial, being inconsistent, or being one-sided in one's commitment. The inner 
fragmentation in the masses, which is unsupportive of individual responsibility and 
a conductor for sentient contagion is reinforced by events that assault the social 
mechanisms12 established to support community in the same way as mental and 
physical illness result from systemic assaults on the psychic mechanisms supporting 
the person. The spiritual reality of community is supported on the one hand by asso-
ciational structures by which human beings organise themselves; and on the other 
by the herd instinct, parallel to and caused by the psychic mechanism of sentient 
contagion. That mechanisms supporting the spiritual reality of the human commu-
nity forms part of it reflects the fact that human beings are not pure spirits, but have 
their spiritual life supported both by what they create themselves and by a psychic 
'Die Frau, ESGA 13:182. 
10Ibid: ,Krankheit unserer Zeit' xii, 7, 13, 74, 79, 245. 'unseres Volkes' 7: Iphigenia withstands 
madness 83, illnesses are of the whole human being 100, comes from original sin 168, 214. Edith 
Stein: Bildung und Entfaltung tier lndividualitfit, ESGA 16: Social illness 23; illnesses of our times 
124. Woman CWES 2 is not an accurate reflection of ESGA 13. The latter includes more material 
and arranges it chronologically. CWES 2 is a translation of a previous edition, Edith Steins Werke 
(ESW) vol. V. 
u 'Woman's Value in National Life' in Woman, CWES vol. II, 259-60 [7J. 
12 Social causality seems to be the formal object of the social sciences. It would be the topic of 
another paper to analyse PPH's contribution towards its clarification. 
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and biological life also on the intersubjective, social level.13 The social functions of 
institutions, established in purpose-built buildings and regulated by customs and 
law are all socially constructed 'mechanisms', but not for that less the real infra-
structure of culture. When natural or historical events destroy the functionality of 
these abruptly or over a period of time without allowing new institutions, buildings 
and customs to arise from the remnants of the old, then the community is attacked 
in the functionality that supports it. This attack may well come from well-meaning 
individuals within it, who desire to break with old traditions, perceived as oppres-
sive. But the limited life power available to the community from its members, no 
matter how positively engaged these would be for the community, and no matter 
how severely threatened by an outside enemy they are, does not allow it to reinvent 
its functionality instantaneously. Such re-emergence takes time and a concerted 
effort that is only possible when new operational modes have established them-
selves by being recognised by the members. The community is thus exposed, in its 
reduction to a mass, to a severe shortage of life power - all that power, namely, it 
would take to (re-)create its supportive functionality instantaneously. Its functional-
ity shattered, the community's channelling of the available life power according to 
a vision of the common good no longer obtains. Compensation mechanisms (dicta-
torships, scapegoat campaigns and pursuit of particular interests falling back on the 
remaining social mechanism of herd mentality operational through sentient conta-
gion) kick in, until such time as the community gets the time and leadership needed 
to rebnild itself. Mental and social illnesses thus are thus both analogous and related 
phenomena, according to Stein, in that they both rely on psychic causality as the 
medium through which they are provoked - and healed. 
In what follows, we shall first look more in depth at Stein's understanding of the 
psyche as a whole and as a unity (]) in order to establish its plausibility. Then, we 
shall look at three aspects of the mechanism of the psyche supportive of normal 
spiritual activity in human beings mentioned by her: vitality, rationality, and trust 
(2). The phenomena of mental illness seem all to have in common that in them these 
three aspects of the psychic mechanism are compromised through psychic causality. 
Finally, we shall look at the different possibilities for contracting mental illness 
through psychic contagion (3), and argue that this causal social dimension of mental 
illness further contributes to render plausible that the specific object studied by psy-
chiatry is the disturbed psyche. 
13 McElligott 2013 explains the failure of the Weimar Republic as a c~sis in the un?erstan~n~ of 
leadership, eventually resulting in a cult of the 'Ftihrer'. Benson 1908 gives a dystop1an descnption 
of such an assault and its consequences for the experience of the individuals. 
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1 The Psyche as a Whole and as a Unity 
Stein sees the psyche as a series of connections - a 'Zusammenhang' - constituted 
from every act experienced as marked by psychic causality or life power. What the 
psyche connects is the spiritual world of values motivating the person and the natu-
ral world of causality, since the motivating power of the values is experienced as 
enlivening or draining and as lending itself to be realised in the world by action. The 
psyche is thus distinct from the spirit, which is sheer motivation and which in con-
trast with the psyche, cannot be causally influenced. In the same way, the ~ersonal 
subJe~t of motivat10n who experiences meaning is distinct from the psycho-physical 
mdiv1dual, which as 'the real sentient subject is constituted on the basis of causal 
relationships' .14 In the case of psycho-physical persons, like human beings, the per-
sonal subject has a psyche, a soul and a body. But the psycho-physical person can-
not be reduced to its psyche, soul or body, and it is the person that has them and is 
the bearer of them_ 1, 
Having a psyche is specific to psycho-physical individuals. Animals other than 
hum~ beings also have a psyche, but pure spirits would have none. Accordingly, 
there 1s anl!llal psychology, but there would be no angelic psychology, nor indeed a 
psy_chology of God: Persons are not necessarily psycho-physical individuals_ 1, Only 
mdiv1duals, who have a psyche, can experience mental health or illness. 
. Psycho-physical individuals like human beings experience what they experience 
m ways that mvolve life-power, i.e. through the psyche. They also experience moti-
vatin? powers in ways that affect the psyche: feelings, in particular, available in 
prmc1ple also to pure spirits as the simple feeling of value, are experienced by us as 
accomp":"'ed by psycho-physical manifestations (e.g. the beating of the heart, the 
constnction of the throat, the blood rising to the face). Only as a limit experience 
can we 'feel' like the angels do: have insight into the motivating power that the 
value 1s, without any emotional psycho-physical accompaniment. This insight, 
however, 1s what we must rely on to be rational; it is sustained by reflection and 
thought. A rational ass_essment of our feelings is necessary because the psycho-
physical feel of the feelings can be mistaken for the value-feelings they accompany, 
and can be transID1tted through sentient contagion, without connection in the person 
affected to the value having motivated it through the personal structure in the trans-
mitter. The affected person may, because of this transmission, constitute a sham 
characte: in himself from feelings that only masquerades as his own. In this way, we 
can be distracted by our feelmgs away from the motivating power of the values and 
mistake the object of our emotional reactions in a way pure spirits cannot. 
14 PPH: 77.Anlnvestigati~n concerning the State, CWES 10: 46: 'Spontaneous acts are free mental 
~ee~~, and we call th~ ~ubJect of su~h deeds a person.' The distinction between the psycho-physical 
mdiv1dual and the spmtual person 1s reflected in the division of Chaps. 3 and 4 of PE. 
15 See note 18. 
16 :P!f: 74: 'a co.nsciousness is conceivable in which the entire "conditioning" stratum would be 
mm,mg, a consc10usness that would unfold without any fluctuation of "aliveness" and that would 
also allow acts to devolve out of itself.' 
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As said, the psyche displays similarities with a reservoir or a battery that can be 
filled or charged by rest and emptied or discharged by activity: life-power being the 
medium that is filling/charging or emptying/discharging. Whereas all experiences 
use up some amount oflife power, positive experiences seem to use less and appear 
even to contribute to replenish the energy reservoir, whereas negative experiences 
consume more and seem sometimes to drain the power reservoir entirely. This 
seems to be because motivational energy (whether positive or negative) contributes 
to or consumes life power when experienced emotionally. It is the psychic causality 
intrinsic to the emotions that has this impact, whereas the 'value-feeling' may be 
had also when there is not enough energy available to even experience the emo-
tion or when the value is considered as a pure possibility. This latter amounts to an 
estimative, intuitive knowledge of the value's motivating power, whereas the former 
is the effect this feeling of value makes on the medium of the psyche through which 
it is felt in psycho-physical individuals. 
The motivational or spiritual energy resulting from the live experience of moti-
vational power in the psyche seeks 'unloading' in bodily feelings, expressions and 
thought, all of which are 'products' of the psyche, i.e. brought forth in its medium 
and experienced as both motivated (meaningful) and embedded in the causal net-
work of nature (i.e. transcendently manifesting in the world or in experience). 17 In 
pure spirits, as in God, spiritual energy would motivate without affecting a psyche 
and without psychic expression: a purely spiritual person would not be subject to 
any charge induced by psycho-physical causality, it cannot be out of its mind with 
fright or seduced by the pleasures of the senses. It is because our psyche is the 
medium through which we experience meaning and is affected causally, also by 
what we experience spiritually, that we can be mentally well or ill. 
From the psyche being a 'Zusammenhang' it does not necessarily follow that we 
experience the psyche as one or indeed as our own exclusively. It seems in fact that 
disturbances may arise from experiences of some foreign experience 'having lodged 
itself in' or, more precisely, being mistaken for ours. We can know such apparent 
lodging is a mistaken attribution because the psyche is necessarily or a priori one 
with the unity of the I since what constitutes it is experiential causality, a feature 
directly or primordially experienced by the I in its own experiences. The I does 
experience foreign experience non-primordially through empathy, however, and 
therefore also 'vicariously' experience the life power experienced by someone else 
in his or her experience. Empathy remains vicarious, though, it is an experience of 
experience, which is not mine. 
17 'Obviously we have to distinguish between "natural" ["natiirliches"] life and life flowing in from 
without, which we call "mental" since it is acquired in mental acts. Yet even without this "influx", 
it seems you have to separate a "sensory" ["sinnliches"] and a "mental" ["geistiges"] stratum, and 
correspondingly a sensory and a mental lifepower, as different roots of the psyche. With sensory 
lifepower, the psyche appears to be sunk into the physis: into bod.illness and, moreover, by means 
ofbodiliness into material nature.[ ... ] Mental lifepower appears to be determined by sensory life-
power: as a rule mental vigour also fades along with bodily vigour. Yet aside from that, mental 
lifepower remains open to influxes from the object world and through them can become capable of 
achievements which don't accord with the state of sensory lifepower.' (PPH: 81 [71)) 
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In contrast with empathy and sentient contagion (which we shall treat further in 
3) stands the experience resulting from unification with others: communal experi-
ence; in its highest intensity, love (PPH: 270). In unification, the I opens itself up to 
a physical, psychic and/or spiritual union with another, that leaves it open to experi-
ence the most intimate stirrings of the soul of the other if this other has opened him 
or herself also to the first. The personality may adapt to the other for his or her sake, 
but the consummated unification presupposes an 'original inner commonality. 
Where that is missing, you can't achieve any community of life, even through the 
most severe inclination to unite' (PPH: 271). 
Although unification in essence is a free act and thus essentially spiritual, one 
can be lured into pseudo-unification under conditions of seduction or confusion. 
Particularly through sexual intercourse, which may be taken to be an expression of 
spiritual unification and tends to accomplish a sharing of life power. We speak of 
sexual abuse of children or of legal minors because their consent to intercourse has 
been lured out of them without legitimate expectation that they know what it entails. 
The psychological risk is that they would open themselves to psychological manip-
ulation, as the repression of a mixture of transferred guilt and shame, whether 
intended by the abuser or not, would give rise to a series of confusing psychological 
symptoms keeping them in his or her power. To see through this illusion and arrive 
at reconstituting psychological integrity can take many years. Normal adults too 
may mistake seductive manipulation for love and compromise their psychological 
integrity in this way. But they are better equipped to trace the origin of experiences 
and hence distinguish between their own psychic life, that of someone else, and that 
which someone else might want them to believe they experience. If, however, early 
compromises have never been fully understood, they could be reiterated as part of a 
desire to come to understand them, and in this way the abused could, tragically, turn 
into an abuser. 
Addictions, of which psychopathic manipulation might be a particular vampire-
like one, feeding off the confused subjection of their victims to their manipulative 
ministrations, arise from unsustainable life power consuming activities, the cessa-
tion of which requires a transformation of character for which life power, because 
of the addiction, is not available through the sentient network. They take many 
forms but have in common that they attempt to fill up the energy reservoir of the 
psyche through goods or experiences of insufficient value while the effort involved 
in acquiring or performing these deplete the psyche completely. Addictions repre-
sent and illustrate bad management of the psychic economy and are reflected in a 
personal character problem. The trap in which they shut the individual can be 
escaped only through activation of the spirit, through motivation by higher values 
placed above those for the sake of which the addiction has been contracted. 
The struggle for psychic unity is in general won through the acting person prefer-
ring higher values to lower ones. This allows a person to live out of the depth ofhis 
or her soul - the psyche in its unity - possessing the three enduring characteristics 
of purity, nobility, and kindness (PPH: 231). The depth dimension of the soul, its 
interiority where these qualities are preserved and from where they radiate, is the 
reason why preference of values is of personal importance. The soul's depth 
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dimension would atrophy were it not vaulted by the personality's preference for 
higher values, and the I would be reduced to its superficial 'self' - the pure I, which 
has no depth. Whereas this would make the person shallow and would cover up the 
permanent qualities of the soul, it would not, however, make him or her mentally ill. 
The 'soullessness' would nevertheless signal an increased nsk of social illnesses 
being contracted in the environment, as the person by the fact of his lack of depth 
would be susceptible to sentient contagion and incapable of community, not 
responding to the higher values and not being united to others by the life of his soul. 
In sum: to Stein the psyche, although a field of conversion of spiritual energy to 
physical energy and of consumption of mental energy in spiritual experience, is 
apriori unified by its pertaining to an I. This I, who in its relation to the spiritual 
world is a person, can protect the depth dimension of the soul, opened up by the 
person's response to higher values and ought to do that in order to be immune to 
social illnesses and conseqeunt compromises to its psychic integrity. In psychic ill-
ness, it is the conversion field of the psyche that is specifically affected in its ability 
to support meaningful experience. 
2 Three Aspects of the Mechanism of the Psyche Supportive 
of Normal Spiritual Activity in Human Beings 
When using the expression 'psychic mechanism', Stein refers to the elements of 
experience that seem to run their course 'before our eyes like an external event' 
(PPH: 103). In contrast, spiritual acts are motivated, and we cannot understand or 
empathise experience unless in relation to what motivates it. We can, ho_wever, take 
notice of causation in relation to experience, as something with which 1t contrasts, 
but which nevertheless forms part of it, and this is what we do as we identify the 
psyche. The whole psyche has, in its connection with spi_ritual acts, the character ?f 
a 'mechanism': psychic causality operates throughout 1t as that which defines 1t. 
• The total sensate causal occurrence may be construed as a conversion of life power 
into active experiencing, and as a utilisation of lifepower by active experiencing' 
(PPH: 27). 'A sensate event is a conversion of lifepower into active experiencing' 
(PPH: 190).18 Because of the transcendence of the psyche new things can be cliscov-
ered about the operation of its mechanisms by the individual and by the scientific 
community. 
The psyche is, by its essence and in contrast with the spirit, experienced as lim-
ited, since it manifests itself as the reason for our experience potentially cutting out. 
Its operations while we are conscious are often not noticed at all, and identifying 
them at all as distinct from spiritual activity demands sustained attention. The lack 
of life power, in contrast, we cannot help but notice, since it is experienced in ways 
we learn to interpret with the help of others as warning signals of an impencling 
is Note that the translator translates 'psychisch' with 'sentient'. 
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breakdown. Being faint from hunger, lack of sleep or illness, experiencing meaning-
lessness, tiredness of perfornting some particular action, emotional over-stimulation 
or depression are all different ways in which we experience the lack of life power in 
a particular form. To avoid being caught in a negative spiral - since the motivating 
power of all of these experiential components is negative - we turn our minds, when 
we suffer from them, towards that from which we can get energy if we cannot get 
the rest, food, meaningful or positive experiences we need. The discovery of higher 
values, whose motivating power can enliven us even when we are depleted, finds its 
occasion here. The denial of the psyche's limitation may also be a strategy in the 
face of depletion, often accompanied by unconscious (compensation) mechanisms 
that source the energy in ways that are ultimately destructive. The most effective 
management of psychic energy is the one that has a clear view of the actual state of 
the psyche, supports it through the sustainable activities of the virtues through 
which .the higher motivating powers are accessed and has no recourse to compensa-
tion mechanisms. 
The rhythm of the psychic processes is in equilibrium when the psyche functions 
as a clear medium for meaningful psycho-spiritual life and experience, drawing 
minimal attention to itself. In this state it protects its integrity by tending to allow 
for the emotional feeling of moderately positive values, since these do not upset this 
equilibrium. The feeling of extremely positive or extremely negative values may 
equally upset it, so these seem to be felt emotionally by us only when we are some-
what out of sorts. The mechanism towards equilibrium is one the person can learn 
to assist, but may also purposefully break experimentally in order to feel the sub-
lime and the horrendous. When the equilibrium is disturbed, whether purposefully 
or not, by depletion from the feeling of extremely powerful feelings, the psyche is 
overwhelmed, and no longer enables the person to 'make sense of' what happens. 
The causal factors which then surface in their raw state manifest themselves as 
symptoms, as do indeed the compensation mechanisms they deploy. All of these 
can, given knowledge of the psyche, be interpreted and assist the subject suffering 
from the distortion of experience in regaining healthy, meaningful experience and 
stop the operation of compensation mechanisms. That is, of course, if the person is 
interested in that. Some prefer the highs and lows of an unstable condition, perhaps 
because they employ them in the service of art or think life is boring without them. 
Stein identifies three types of mental pathology, which may be linked in a con-
crete subject but nevertheless are distingnishable. The first of these is derangement, 
which insists on and attempts to realise what is impossible, for the sake of its value 
alone. This is an anomaly of the spirit, not of the psyche, and it could therefore 
characterise the acts of pure spirits as well as of human beings. Whereas it may 
provoke psychic illness in human beings, it is not itself a disorder of the psyche, 
since it is not due to psychic causality but exists simply in spiritual acts. The second 
type of mental pathology is psychic illnesses properly speaking, where spiritual 
intelligibility is preserved, but transposed by altered psychic states causally induced, 
and thus not understandable without a causal key to the interpretation of the 
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symptoms. The third type of mental pathology is 'breakdowns', where even the 
symptoms are understandable as rationally motivated by events.19 
Derangement may well accompany and induce mental illness, but as a spiritual 
anomaly it can also exist in persons who do not exhibit any of the symptoms we 
associate with mental illness. When the negative value of deranged acts and persons 
is felt emotionally, the causal impact of this feeling may constitute a challenge to the 
mental health of the deranged or of others, depending on the height of the value for 
the sake of which the derangement is effectuated. If the value is noble, the deranged 
person also will be, and will constitute less of a threat to himself or others. If the 
value is low, the deranged person will constitute a threat, unless he or those sur-
rounding him have rendered themselves insensitive at the cost of superficiality, 
which in turn would constitute a risk for contraction and transmission of sentient 
contagion. The causal momentum may, in severe cases assisted by contagion, be 
transferred by projection and attributed to other individuals, who then are made to 
serve as scapegoats. Such deranged contagious transfers may, under social condi-
tions marked by superficiality, be undertaken to deliberately call forth a psychic 
breakdown in others. Breakdowns caused in this way would pertain to the third type 
of mental pathologies mentioned by Stein: they would be understandable both in 
what caused them and in its effect. While the normal functioning of the psyche is of 
value, it is not a value it may not be reasonable to subordinate to other values: 
Deliberately inducing a mental breakdown in another is, for example, of lower value 
than suffering one. Derangement with preference for lower values is also of lower 
value than mental illness properly speaking, and it would thus be rational to prefer 
the latter to the former. 
Stein mentions three ways in which the mechanism of the psyche supports nor-
mal psycho-spiritual activity. First, its rhythmic regularity supports and equilibrates 
the vitality of the individual. Second, this vitality enables the individual to be ratio-
nal and not be overtaken by subconscious motivations, prejudices and contagion. 
Thirdly, rationality allows the person to think and evaluate situations objectively, 
and thereby affords the individual natural trust in those matters into which it gains 
insight. If either of these is compromised, the other two may compensate, with a 
19 'Rationally, one can will only the possible. But there are irrational people who do not care 
whether what they have recognised as valuable is realisable or not. They will it for its value alone, 
attempting to make the impossible possible. Pathological psychic life indicates that what is contra-
dictory to rational laws is really possible for many people. We call this mental derangement. 
Moreover, psychic lawfulness can here be completely intact. On the other hand, in some psychic 
illnesses rational laws of the spirit remain completely intact, for example in anaesthesia, aphasia, 
etc. We recognise a radical difference between spiritual and psychic anomalies. In cases of the 
second kind, the intelligibility of foreign psychic life is completely undisturbed; we must only 
empathise changed causal relationships. However, in mental illness we can no longer understand 
because we can only empathise a causal sequence separately and not a meaningful proceeding of 
experiences. Finally, there is still a series of pathological cases in which neither the psychic mecha-
nism nor rational lawfulness seems to be severed. Rather, these cases are experiential modifica-
tions of the frame of rational laws, for example, depression following a catastrophic event. Not 
only is the portion of the psychic life spared by the illness intelligible here, but also the pathologi-
cal symptom itself.' PE: 97. 
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resulting strain on the remaining two. In the opposite direction, the psyche can also 
be strengthened by conscious, insightful effort, by a regular, well-balanced life, by 
living sensibly in accordance with insight and by trusting that everything and all 
manner of things shall be well. 
Vitality is the result or manifestation of the fundamental and characteristic abil-
ity of the psyche to charge and discharge, replenish and spend energy by a cycle of 
sleep, activity, nourishment and relaxation. If this mechanism is compromised by 
depletion, or deprivation of sensual or intellectual stimuli, the ability to identify or 
constitute things weakens and a state of wake dreamino or conditioned fantasisino 0 0 
sets in, as the mind has insufficient or too much unspent lifepower to constitute, 
understand and interpret its experience adequately. This insufficiently constituted or 
overly re-constituted experience may display patterns of underlying impulses or 
structures, the origin of which cannot be determined with accuracy. These patterns 
might be seen, along Jungian lines, as archetypal symbols focusing projections like 
metal rods channel a current in an electric field.20 It is conceivable that megalomania 
and paranoia refer to typical patterns of interpretation of causally distorted experi-
ence. It is also conceivable that alternating states of depression and hyperactivity 
can result from the basic rhythm of the psyche being pushed in its resting into apa-
thy and in its spending of mental energy into frenzied activity and that both condi-
tions would have a tendency to reinforce one another such that the cycle would be 
difficult to break. The economy of the psyche, although open to the spirit, is not by 
nature spiritual. It is an economy all living, conscious beings experience in their 
experience, and it can be compromised in all of them for similar reasons. Animals, 
however, do not loose their mind exactly, having none quite to loose, but they do 
experience trauma from exhaustion or cruel treatment and depression if it is pro-
longed. In humans, however, the story bebiud sleeplessness, alcoholism, anorexia or 
obsessive-compulsive behaviour is experienced in terms of its spiritual content. 
Rationality is sustained when the psyche has sufficient vitality for identifying 
things objectively and for acting in consequence thereof. It relies on a high level of 
alertness, capacity for concentration, and emotional detachment, all of which makes 
the rational person vulnerable to extreme tiredness and strong emotions, as both 
challenge the ability to constitute things as they are according to themselves, inde-
pendently of personal interests, emotions or desires. 
If vitality is so compromised that the experience of objectivity breaks down, then 
rationality also breaks down, as the ability to identify premises and reason from 
them to conclusions or correctly identify acts and reason from them to their motivat-
ing power therewith ceases to function consistently. Rationality is the ability to 
follow motivated sequences stepwise, to conclude from something meaningful to its 
implications, whether to how it arose or to what it will occasion. The clearheaded 
healthy individual is not susceptible to let unconscious motives rule his or her 
actions, or even to mistake the motivating powers motivating a feeling, a gesture or 
an act for apparent ones in others. The rational individual has insight into the 
20 PPH: !, IV. 
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motivating powers and consciously chose between them, in such a way as to be able 
to account for his choices. The rational person can therefore be responsible. 
Irrationality, in contrast, because of its low level of motivatedness, is compatible 
with high levels of associative imagination and psychic contagion, such that it 
allows for superstition, prejudice and 'group-think'. It may masquerade as creativ-
ity, but in fact it is without objective meaning-content. This may appear fine to the 
one whose psyche is depleted and whose experience as a consequence is distorted. 
He does not have the energy to care about accuracy in details or clearly justifiable 
motives for constitution. This is how a collective dream state can replace objectivity 
in a community reduced to a mass. 
Existential trust is the person's acceptance of the limitations of his psyche, such 
that he rests in taking what comes without succumbing to either anxiety or self-
delusion. It is linked to the experience of 'resting in God', which already the non-
believing Stein recognised as the muster for recharging the battery of the psyche. It 
allows for vitality since it conserves rather than spends energy and thus also sustains 
rationality. Anguish, in contrast, is very high in energy consumption, also in its less 
debilitating varieties of anxiety and worry. 21 It frequently impacts vitality and some-
times rationality, although it does not prevent the naked value-feeling, just the 
enjoyment of its positive emotional impact. Compared to trust, which abides by the 
meaning of things and sustains our interest in them, anguish is an upsetting and 
debilitating flight from the meaning of things as it recedes. 
Together, vitality, rationality and trust sustain the normal psycho-spiritual expe-
rience of human beings, such that it is experienced as meaningful.22 To the extent 
that their opposite qualities gain the upper hand, mental illness results. Preventing 
or stopping this from happening is thus the task involved in preserving or regaining 
mental health. The diet of the monasteries: a regular, sober life in community, 
uncompromising virtue and trusting God in everything proposes the ideal, which 
Stein in fact herself chose. Such a diet equilibrates, channels and preserves life power 
and thus prevents its depletion, but it is not chosen for the sake of mental health, nor 
indeed is it a means towards it if chosen for the sake of it. Preferring mental health 
to higher things is not conducive towards it. 
Understanding it, helping others to achieve it and alleviating their suffering from 
it is, however, a higher thing: the vocation of the psychiatrist. The means at his dis-
position are medication, often used to regulate the rhythm of the psyche and stop the 
collossal energy expenditure associated with anxiety; counselling, psycho-analysis 
and coguitive therapy, sometimes delegated to psychologists and mostly helping 
21 'Anxiety, to be sure, is under ordinary circumstances not the dominant mood of human life. It 
overshadows everything else only under pathological conditions, while normally we go through 
life almost as securely as if we had a really furn grip on our existence.' (Finite and Eternal Being, 
CWES 9: 59/ Endliches und ewiges Sein, ESGA 11-12: 59). See also Stein's treatment of 
Heidegger's concept of anguish in the appendix to Finite and Eternal Being, at the present avail-
able in English translation only in a separate translation (Lebech 2007). 
22 A study of how these three aspects are affected in the various psychiatric diagnoses would be too 
involved for the present study, which only aims to outline the way the psychic mechanism is com-
promised in mental illness in general. 
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sufferers to understand how the psyche works in relation to the spirit and what can 
be done differently to prevent suffering; and finally referral to other professionals, 
such as priests or spiritual practitioners, whose insight is believed to be of benefit to 
the patient in his recovery. All of these are healing in so far as they sustain vitality, 
assists rationality and supports trust, in short: help the patient to work himself back 
to health by means of psychic causality. 
3 Sentient Contagion and Mental Illness 
Whereas psychic energy can be employed in many ways, motivational energy is in 
contrast directional: it is power to spend in a particular way on a certain type of 
action. Motivational energy is understood in terms of the values, which are the moti-
vating powers 'behind' it, explaining it. We do not accept all motivating powers as 
'ours' by allowing them to motivate us and thus we talk about 'my' values or 'our' 
values as those that we 'have', which we allow 'into' us as what motivates us in our 
attempt to realise them. We can also be affected through psychic causality by values 
that are not ours. This happens mainly through psychic contagion, whether with real 
or represented emotion, and the closing of oneself to it is different from the closing 
of oneself to a motivating power, as this latter is accomplished simply by preferring 
something else to it, whereas the former involves closing oneself to a causal impact 
already experienced, by deflecting it internally. Stein says the following about this 
free ability to close oneself off against unwanted influences: 
... the individual person [ ... ] has the freedom to nip in the bud any stirrings of the soul that 
are induced within her. That goes for stirrings that are merely transferred (an anger or an 
ardour that she has acquired through mere contagion, without having apprehended any cor-
responding value or disvalue), as well as those that are adequately motivated (a hate, per-
haps, that is well founded in the individual distinctiveness of what is hated). In this way she 
can work against the impact of the surroundings upon the development of her properties and 
perhaps suspend it entirely (PPH: 268-9). 
Psychic contagion takes the form of an instinctive imitation of movements, 
expressions or psychic states that may import contents to which a genuine personal 
value response can also arise. 23 It remains that the contents are imported, without 
23 PPH: 182-6. Stein concludes her discussion of the three ways in which instinctive imitation 
operates with the following consideration: 'The foregoing considerations have taught us that there 
is such a thing as an impact of one sentient individual upon another [even] when no mental func-
tioning of any kind is in play. What this makes possible is a modification of the behaviour of one 
individual under the influence of another, a conformity in behaviour of a series of individuals who 
mutually influence one another, and finally an intermeshing of functionalities of different individu-
als which serves objectively one purpose. What is not possible without mental activation is any 
stance-taking of the individuals to one another, any consensus or any methodical cooperation with 
it, and finally any collective behaviour in the genuine sense. The collectivity of behaviour includes 
an experiencing as a collective experiencing: and this "experiencing as" is itself a mental function-
ing.' (PPH: 187). 
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the person having specifically and consciously adopted the values to which the 
imported psychic energy is a motivated response, refracted through the p~rsonality 
who originally felt them. Deflecting the foreign psychic energy before 1t gets to 
affect ( or 'infect') the psyche causally involves a realisation of the automatic nature 
of the imitation, and with it of the foreign source of the emotional content. In so far 
as one cannot share the transmitted content personally, i.e. as a response to values 
one can hold as one's own, then one can wilfully deflect or eject the content out of 
the psyche, as an irrelevant foreign element, which has no place in and no meaning 
for me. 
Through the phenomenon of psychic contagion it is possible to understand how 
one psycho-physical person can appear to 'possess' another. As an emphatic person-
ality expresses his feelings to an impressionable one, the latter'. bemg impressed 
with the contents transmitted through instinctive imitation/psychic contagrnn, nus-
takenly takes these to be his own, without himself having performed the_ value 
response from which they originated. If the impressed pe'.s~n 1s. happy with his 
resulting pseudo-personality and the suspension of respons1b1hty 11 enlalls, 1t will 
take longer for reflection on his experience to enable him to realise the suspension 
of his personality. If not, the feeling of being not quite himself will make the suf-
ferer learn to see through the mechanics of the contagion in proportion to his desire 
for authenticity and freedom. 
However, Stein does not exclude the possibility of a more direct and powerful 
possession, which does not involve the phenomenon of psychic contagion, and 
which is attributable solely to a spiritual subject.24 That the body and the psyche can 
be possessed (and that my body and my psyche must be possessed by me if I am to 
be fully myself) forms part of the natural economy of psycho-physical mdiv1duals: 
it forms part of hmnan nature, and is not by itselfa sign ofour fallen state. To realise 
personal freedom, however, the person must learn to shut him or herseff off agamst 
unwanted influences, to be immune to sentient contag10n and to actively stnve 
towards self-possession through the acquisition of virtue. For help in this it can 
enlist the succour of other persons, whether hmnan, angelic or divine: Self-
possession is ultimately a gift from God. 
24 'Die Perstinlichkeit ist aber nicht auf den Leib bescbrankt und auch nicht so an ihn gebunden, 
daB an allem, woran der Leib beteiligt ist, auch die PersOnlichkeit beteiligt sein miiBte. Nehmen 
wir das Phanomen der ,,Besessenheit": wenn ein MOnch in der Kirche zu toben und den 
Heiligtiimern zu fluchen beginnt, so werden diese A.uBerungen von den Glaubigen ~c~t i~ 
sondern dem Teufel zugeschrieben, der von ihm Besitz ergriffen hat. Da8 es derselbe Le~b 1st, .ffilt 
dem man es zu tun hat. besagt noch nicht, daB die handelnde PersOnlichkeit dieselbe 1st. D1ese 
bekommt man also mit Hilfe der Raum- und Zeitstelle, die den Leib bestimmen, nicht zu fassen. 
Wer das Beispiel nicht scblagend findet, weil er nicht an den Teufel glaubt, de.n mOchten wir an. die 
Fiille erinnern, wo man von ,,Unzurechnungsfahigkeit" spricht. Ob man die Handlungen emes 
Trunkenen oder Geisteskranken einem b5seil Geist zuschreibt oder auf einen anormalen Zu~tand 
zurtickfiihrt - auf jeden Fall nimmt man an, daB die PersOnlichkeit des Mens~hen ~. sem~~ 
Verbal ten nicht beteiligtist. Und damit ist zugegeben, worauf es uns ankommt: daB die lndiv1duahtat 
einer Person auf andere Weise als <lurch die Raum- und Zeitstelle ihres Leibes bestimmt werden 
muB.' Einjuhrung in der Philosophie, ESGA 8: 203. The translation of Einfiihrung is under prepa-
ration by Antonio Calcagno. 
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4 Conclusion 
To Stein the proper object of psychology is the psyche, constituted from all the ele-
ments of experience in which life power plays a role. In so far as psychic illness 
affects the psyche specifically (not the spirit, although this might suffer derange-
ment, and not the soul, although it may be at stake), the proper object studied by 
psychiatry would be the disturbances that affect the psyche, in whatever way and for 
whatever reason they occur. To Stein the mechanism of the psyche operates cen-
trally in three central psycho-spiritual functions that support meaningful experienc-
ing. These - vitality, rationality and trust - are characteristically compromised in 
mental illness. As functions they are compromised through psychic causality affect-
ing the psyche in three ways: through emotions, through psychic contagion or 
through the body. The healing of the psyche happens in the opposite direction, but 
by the same means: through psychic causality channelled through spiritual acts 
(which is why both the practice of virtue, cognitive therapy and meditation can be 
helpful); through a supportive environment (the help of friends and family) or 
through the support provided by medication. Possibly the most effective treatment 
includes all three, but each can contribute to accomplish the task separately. 
In so far as this is the case, psychiatry is not a natural science any more than 
psychology is. Its object of study is the dysfunctional psyche, i.e. the one that does 
not support meaningful experience. Nor can psychiatry be reduced to a spiritual 
practice, since the disturbances occur as a result of the mechanisms of the psyche 
having been affected. 
Reductionist psychiatric approaches, whether they regard their object to pertain 
to nature or to spirit exclusively, significantly and needlessly add to the sufferings of 
the mentally ill. It would constitute great progress for the psychiatric profession and 
for psychiatry as a science if this were to be no longer the case. 
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